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Abstract 
To contribute to a critical sociological understanding of the political struggles centering around 
the canonized memory of the Holocaust, this article proposes an extended comparative study 
of early postwar discursive constructions of the recent past. Focusing empirically on pre-Cold 
War Hungary, it analyzes three major institutional discourses, each conceptualizing the recent 
past as catastrophe: the jurisdiction on political crimes, official religious statements, and public 
interpretations of intellectuals. The article argues that before the rise of Holocaust-memory, 
there existed a discursive regime dealing with the historical period of the Second World War. 
Though this regime around the concept of catastrophe did not apply the Jewish identification, 
it allowed to confront former acts of Nazi persecution. 
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For a critical sociological understanding of the present, this article proposes an extended 
comparative study of early postwar discursive constructions of the past.1 Focusing empirically 
on pre-Cold War Hungary, it argues that well before the historical construction of Holocaust 
memory in the 1960s and 1970s, a discursive regime of dealing with the historical period of the 
Second World War existed, having the concept of catastrophe at its center. Although the 
specific fate of the Jews did not play a central role in it, the catastrophe-conception allowed to 
deal with acts of Nazi persecution. What is more, it had its characteristic norms and 
representational repertoire, radically different from today’s moral universals of Holocaust-
memory.2 In order to critically understand the way the present-day normative discourse of 
Holocaust-memory determines not only social relations to the past but also political action in 
general, this article calls for an historical sociological study of the discursive regime around the 
concept of catastrophe. In other words, I am not interested here in how societies remembered 
or forgot the Holocaust per se, but in the historical development of normative relations to the 
past. The problem of Holocaust-memory is crucial for a critical sociology of the present because 
it has become socially and culturally central on a transnational scale.  
The memory of the Holocaust has become detached from its historical and geographical 
context. It now serves as a point of reference for representing historical events temporarily and 
spatially far away from the Second World War. Moreover, by the normative order it prescribes, 
transnational Holocaust-memory frames social and political action: it determines the social 
conditions of group formation and strategies of political action. Key features of this normative 
order are the “duty to remember”, the individualization of history (the central role of witness 
testimony in historical representation), historical experience as trauma, the political actor as 
victim, and the historical event as a crime.3 Public debates about official representations of 
 
 
history show very well how the normative regime of transnational Holocaust-memory defines 
political action. They usually unfold around the questions of uniqueness of the Holocaust and 
of historical truth: one side claims that the other falsifies history while the other accuses the 
first of appropriating the suffering. This can be demonstrated on the example of the monument 
to the victims of German occupation in Budapest, erected in 2014 as part of the 70th anniversary 
of the Holocaust in Hungary. The monument applies the repertoire of cultural representation of 
the Holocaust when commemorating the suffering of the victims as a duty to remember, 
however, it constructs the Hungarian nation as the victim of Nazi Germany. In line with the 
claim that Nazism brought suffering not only to “the Jews” but also to “the Hungarians”, the 
occupation of the country is conceived as a historical trauma. The Hungarian perpetrators of 
the Holocaust remain unrepresented, while its victims have to face the fact that they are 
supposed to assume national community with their former persecutors. Two opposing sides 
emerge in the debate, Jews and Hungarians, and their desired reconciliation is supposed to be 
based on their common past suffering as victims of the Third Reich. This case clearly shows 
the limits of the currently dominant strategy of reconciliation, defined by the trauma-paradigm.4 
Social groups are competing to have “their memories” recognized and thus to legitimize group 
boundaries and acquire material and symbolic reparation for past damages. Instead of standing 
in the paradigm of “memory competition”,5 this paper contributes to the sociological critique 
of the conditions of competition. One way of doing this involves historical, or more precisely 
genealogical research, which enables us to look at the present-day regime of memory through 
the reconstruction of already forgotten discourses on the past.6  
The historical sociological approach applied here draws on two lines of argumentation in the 
scholarship. One deals with the way societal relations to the past are exposed to change in time, 
that is, with the history of historical experience. A great number of works have demonstrated 
that the 1970s indicated a thorough transformation in the regime of historicity,7 a turn from 
history to memory, from the future to the past. Our sense of time, characterized by the moral 
obligation of commemoration, conceived as preservation, seems to be radically different from 
those living after the war (and those who actually lived through the war). In the following I will 
thus take into account how those living in the 1940s experienced history – an experience, which 
influenced their thoughts and actions in relation to the past. The other line of argumentation is 
provided by recent Holocaust studies on the early post-war period. Scholars working on the 
Aftermath have criticized the previously widely shared understanding that Jewish survivors 
began to remember the Holocaust only in the 1960s.8 I will follow this line of argumentation 
with three considerable and interrelated differences.  
First and foremost, the following study applies a prospective perspective9 when analyzing 
discourses on the past in the early postwar period. Research made on the normative basis of the 
present-day memory of the Holocaust is often retrospective when looking for – mostly in vain 
– the same cultural relevance of the destruction of European Jews in the past; also, it is often 
teleological when assuming that what actually happened was not only a probable outcome but 
a necessary development in history. By its detachment from the context of the war, the cultural 
significance of Holocaust-memory has become central since the 1960s: before turning into a 
symbol of unprecedented and unconceivable human suffering, the memory of Jewish suffering 
was attached to the diverse war experiences. 10  Canonized Holocaust historiography, 
characterized by its strong retrospective stance, often fails even to recognize that the destruction 
 
 
of the Jews was remembered and retold – though in different ways – already in the 1940s. As 
Cesarani put it, “‘The Holocaust’ as we know it, is not to be found in these post war 
accomplishments, but by the 1950s the first layer of historiography and literature had been 
laid.”11Accordingly, Holocaust historiography excludes a multiplicity of sources dealing with 
the history of the destruction of the Jews differently than today. This is the case, most of all, 
with various accounts of survivors, journalists, or medical personnel immediately after the war: 
“until recently, histories of ‘Holocaust literature’ and historiographical surveys have ignored 
most of these, either because they did not appear in English or because they did not address the 
fatal peculiarity of the Jewish situation.”12 Studies often disregard the accounts of those of 
Jewish origin who did not speak as Jews, or sometimes even considered this a suppression or 
effacement of Jewishness.13 From the perspective of Holocaust-memory, for example, the 
distinction is not visible between Jews (who identify themselves as such) and those qualified as 
Jews (forcibly identified as such by Nazi authorities), which played a crucial role in postwar 
discourses. Acknowledging the historicity of the Holocaust memory-construction means that 
the diverse sources about the destruction of European Jewry are integrated into the scope of 
analysis when mapping the discursive field of the early postwar period. The fact that those who 
witnessed the war did not conceptualize what had happened as we do today does not mean that 
they remained silent. They simply spoke differently. 
Second, the analysis of discursive constructions of the past is inspired by conceptual history,14 
as it intends to reconstruct the structural relations between “space of experience” and “horizon 
of expectation” of different social agents in a given historical situation. Besides recognizing 
that utterances of Jews from non-Jewish positions took an important part in discourses on the 
destruction of European Jewry, this article extends the scope of research also in terms of the 
subject of discourse. In other words, the scope of the research is not restricted to the conceptions 
of the suffering of the Jews. Drawing the entire discursive field in which utterances addressed 
the past, that is, not limiting it to the concept of Holocaust, is a precondition of understanding 
what norms influenced in what way the social relations to the past in a historical period prior to 
the construction of normative Holocaust-memory. 
Third, the exploration of this normative discursive field enables us not only to understand how 
and why the memory of the Holocaust has emerged as the ultimate symbol of evil and 
inexplicable suffering but also to uncover other conceptions of the past that have been forgotten 
or marginalized. The critical potential of the following study, inspired by Foucauldian 
genealogy,15 lies precisely in the fact that by reproducing passed futures it enables a critical 
reading of the present. It provides subject positions, strategies of representation and normative 
principles through which the present-day regime of memory can be questioned. By focusing on 
the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in Hungary, this article demonstrates how 
the analysis of the conditions of social struggles over the past contributes to the repertoire of 
sociological critique of the prevailing memory politics. The question is not what actually 
happened in Hungary in the so-called coalition years (1945-48), 16  whether Hungarians 
confronted the past or not, but the conditions of possibility of actions in relation to the recent 
past, the conditions according to which, if one intends to do so, postwar dealing with the past 
can be measured and judged.  
From several possible principles of mapping the field of postwar Hungarian public discourses 
(such as political affiliation, literary genre, personal recollection, and theoretic approach), I 
 
 
chose to analyze institutional statements. The reason behind this is that arguably 
institutionalized discourses had the greatest impact on the population. Although it is really 
difficult, if impossible, to measure the impact of discourses, one possible way is by taking into 
account the social institution as the producer of a particular discourse. In the following, I map 
the discursive field according to three types of institutions. The most powerful discourse-
producer in the period was the state. On the state level, I analyze people’s jurisdiction 
(retribution trials), which dealt explicitly with the political significance of the recent past. The 
first decree on people’s jurisdiction came out as early as January 1945, and after a major 
modification in April, it was adopted as a law in September 1945.17  The second type of 
discourse-producer was the Church. The majority of the population belonged to Christian 
Churches. 18  To give an insight into the discourse(s) by which the Christian Churches in 
Hungary addressed the recent past, I will rely on two official statements, one made by the 
Catholic Church, and one by the protestant churches. In order to take into account Jewish 
religious standpoints, I will analyze the journal of the Orthodox Israelites and that of the Neolog 
Fraction.19 Finally, the third type of discourse-producer was the public intellectual. Here I will 
discuss leading public intellectuals interpreting the recent past by a close reading of publicist 
articles in the national press that came out almost immediately the battle front left Hungary. 
The genre of opinion article enabled the immediate response to topical questions, however, at 
the same time this rapid form of discourse did not make possible the elaboration of profound 
explanations (the authors, mostly scholars and professionals, usually edited their series of 
articles into a monograph a couple of years later). Public intellectuals are selected according to 
the way they experienced the war. In each typical conception of the catastrophe I will touch 
upon the role of Jewish identification. 
It should be noted that the reconstruction of the religious and intellectuals’ discourses of the 
catastrophe are far from exhaustive. Instead of mapping the entire discursive field of the post-
catastrophic period, which would far exceed the scope of this contribution, it is rather the cross-
comparison of institutionally prescribed positions and strategies of past representation, which 
lies in the center of this article. To allow further comparison, additional mapping of religious 
and intellectual discourses is necessary. I argue that to critically understand the present day 
discursive order, it is necessary to reconstruct the conceptual map of the catastrophe in the 
Aftermath. Since the analysis of language use is essential in this method, and the aim is a 
grounded comparison, I do not aspire here for an illusory sociological representativeness. 
Rather, I will deal intensively with selected discursive units.  
 
Bringing To Justice Those Who Caused the Historical Catastrophe 
Besides justification committees20 and relocation/internment, people’s jurisdiction was among 
the most important ways of historical justice in the immediate aftermath of the war. 21 In 
accordance with paragraph 14 of the armistice agreement signed in Moscow on January 20, 
1945,22 these newly established institutions of political justice primarily dealt with political 
crimes,23  delivering their verdicts on the basis of one’s role in the previous regime. The 
preamble of the decree on people’s courts24 declares that all those “who caused or participated 
in the historical catastrophe which happened to the Hungarian people” should be punished as 
soon as possible. The jurisdiction and the actual practice of people’s courts can be interpreted 
as a specific state-level institutional answer of the Hungarian legislation and judicatory practice 
 
 
to the most acute problems of the postwar era, resulting from the “historical catastrophe”: how 
to eliminate the remnants of the criminal and unjust past in order to establish the new democratic 
order. Beyond retribution, the main role attributed to these institutions included political 
emancipation, which meant making “the people” the subject of historical justice through the 
organization and composition of the people’s courts’ councils, and the regulation of the 
proceeding; production of historical truth by way of presenting original documents and 
providing testimonies of defendants and witnesses; and contribution to the moral rebirth of the 
community through inscribing the difference between wrong and right in relation to past events. 
In order to reconstruct how this state-level legal discourse conceptualized the “historical 
catastrophe”, I will confine myself to the analysis of the classification of political crimes and 
of the juridical practice. 
  
Political Crimes of the Past 
Before I analyze ways in which Hungarian legislators conceptualized the catastrophe by 
classifying political crimes of the past, the impact of the emerging international penal law on 
the situation in Hungary needs to be clarified. Postwar European justice was established on two 
separate yet connected levels. While the international legislation in the Nuremberg trials dealt 
with crimes not exclusively linked to national territories, national people’s tribunals treated 
local cases. While Nuremberg required new forms of international legislation, people’s courts 
entailed new forms of national justice. Although they applied different criminal categorizations, 
the two levels were also connected: countries had to extradite individuals to the international 
court if needed, and the international legal proceedings certainly influenced the way national 
courts delivered their verdicts. 25  Today, historiography tends to interpret the Hungarian 
legislation on people’s courts on the basis of the categorization developed for the Nuremberg 
trial of the principal war criminals: crime against peace, war crime, crime against humanity.26 
However, Hungarian legislation introduced two new types of political crimes, neither of them 
completely fitting to either of the categories of the London Agreement of August 8, 1945 that 
formed the basis for the subsequent Nuremberg trials. As a matter of fact, the Hungarian 
legislation had been introduced already before the publication of the London Agreement. The 
Hungarian National Front of Independence declared already on December 3, 1944 that “The 
traitors of the nation and the war criminals must be arrested and delivered to future people’s 
courts, initiated on this purpose”.27 In a grass-root manner, certain national committees (local 
political authorities) had authorized political retribution even before the national decree on the 
people’s courts was formulated on January 25, 1945.28 The decree came into effect on February 
5, 1945, and the procedures commenced accordingly.29 Contemporaries were aware of the 
preparation and the proceedings of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal and they 
dealt with the question of whether the Hungarian legislation on political crimes was in 
accordance with the international one.30 Usually they answered with a definitive yes.  
In Hungary, causing the catastrophe, or participating in it, was perceived as a crime of political 
nature. As the legal expert Imre Szabó emphasized: “these are political trials, and in some 
extent of a new type, that, either one perceives it or not, have their specific nature”, namely that 
“the object of the criminal case is a political act and the political nature of the act has to set the 
framework and procedure of the whole criminal case”.31 In order to “provide the possibility to 
retaliate against all those acts that directly or indirectly put Hungary into this terrible 
 
 
catastrophe”32, the Hungarian decree on people’s courts defined two new types of political 
crime: war crime (it included both what the international legislation called crime against peace 
and war crime),33 and crime against the people (népellenes bűn).34 This classification echoes 
the formulation of the program of the Hungarian National Front of Independence, which 
mentions “traitors of the nation” and “war criminals” as perpetrators of political crimes. 
Legislators categorized past political crimes by substantial law, that is, by defining the object 
of the crime: while war crime referred to making offensive war and breaking conventions of 
waging a war, war propaganda and collaboration with German military and security forces, 
crime against the people included mainly persecution of social categories (the decree speaks of 
“certain layers of the people”, “layers of society”, and “racial and denominational hatred”), 
fostering fascist and antidemocratic ideas in public, and collaboration with anti-popular state 
forces and organizations. After its first modification in April 1945, the text of the ministerial 
decree on people’ jurisdiction was published and distributed together with the expositional 
interpretation of the Minister of Justice. István Ries defined crimes against the people as acts 
that were not connected to the war, did not serve Hungary’s involvement (or intensified its 
participation) in the war, or the prevention of the armistice agreement, but were realized 
“against some groups of the Hungarian people, namely the Jews or the democratic elements”.35  
Then existing interpretations found a causal relation between the two types of political crimes. 
Explaining the new penal categorization, Ries argued that the catastrophe did not commence 
with the war, it was “rooted in the counterrevolution following the 1919 revolution” that is, in 
the so-called Horthy-regime under which “Hungarian soil was mined, and the seeds of hatred 
were scattered”.36 Imre Szabó’s judicial interpretation of the Hungarian legislation on political 
crimes corresponds with this explanation. He argues that the legislators considered the 
Hungarian participation in war as the logical consequence of a uniform anti-popular policy 
going back before the war years, even to 1919. In consequence, war crimes were connected 
directly to the Second World War, while crimes against the people were related to the politics 
that led Hungary into the war.37 In parallel to the causal relation between the two types of 
political crime, in general, the possible punishment of crimes against the people was less severe 
than in the case of war crimes. 
 
The Catastrophe and the “Jewish Question” 
The legislation on people’s courts conceptualized the recent catastrophe in the national 
framework: it happened to the Hungarian people and it was the Hungarians who were the 
subject of the catastrophe. This legal discourse seemingly did not recognize the significance of 
the Holocaust, since it did not apply the category of Jewish. Today historians tend to interpret 
this retrospectively and in a teleological manner as “underplaying the tragedy of the Final 
Solution”, 38  or as the “suppression” 39  of the Holocaust. 40  At the same time, the lacking 
references to the Holocaust in the legal discourse on political crimes can be striking since the 
so-called Jewish question was an important public matter in the early post-war years. Two 
questions arise from this. The first is whether people’s jurisdiction was applicable to the crimes 
related to the persecution of the Jews, while the second refers to the problem of Jewish 
participation in the formation of the postwar historical justice system.  
The answer to the first is a definitive yes: acts of antisemitic persecution could be qualified as 
both categories of political crimes. They could fall into the category of war crimes, according 
 
 
to point 5 of §11 referring to the violation of conventions and international agreements on 
waging war, the treatment of POWs, and the atrocities committed against the civilian 
population, including “people’s illegal execution and torture”. For instance, György Horváth, 
commander of the police in Kassa (Košice), was convicted of war crimes because he committed 
atrocities during the ghettoization and deportation of the Jews, similarly to József Miklósi, 
second-in-command in a labor service company, accused of atrocities committed during the 
“death march”.41 Béla Buócz, commander of the police in Szeged after October 15, 1944, was 
indicted of war crimes because he had occupied a high position in the Arrow Cross 
administration.42 Another case shows that not only high ranked political representatives could 
be brought to justice because they had persecuted the Jews. An individual was convicted of 
committing crimes against the people, because he in June 1944 denounced a hiding married 
couple to the police. According to the interpretation of the National Council of People’s Courts 
(the court of second instance whose councils were composed of professional legal delegates of 
the coalition parties), the defendant was to be indicted also of war crimes because “uncovering 
the identity of the plaintiffs before the police caused their arrest, internment and later 
deportation, so it gave a hand to the fascist police and military authorities in committing violent 
acts against their persons”.43 What is more, even Jews could be indicted of the anti-Jewish 
persecution. Dezső Schwartz, assistant to a barber in a concentration camp near Auschwitz, had 
“maltreated and beaten his deported fellows without any reason”, because he wanted to 
demonstrate his gratitude for being granted his prominent position in the camp. He was accused 
of war crimes “since he was culprit in illegal torture of people abroad”.44 
Persecution of people of Jewish origin could have been indicted also as a crime against the 
people. This category involved various acts of persecution of the Jews so instead of listing 
different cases, I turn to how the Minister of Justice interpreted the applicable paragraphs in a 
booklet explaining the decree on people’s courts.45 Although the text of the decree does not use 
the category of a “Jew” or “Jewish”, and the persecution of non-Jewish “layers of society” 
(according to religion, class, or political affiliation) could also be indicted of crime against the 
people, most of the examples given by the minister are related to the persecution of the Jews. 
According to Ries, the first point of §15 of the decree refers to individuals in high position, 
ministers, and MPs, among others, “who initiated the measures against the Jews or consciously 
took part in their adoption”. Besides the anti-Jewish laws from 1938, Ries included the measure 
of numerus clausus in 1920.46 The second point refers to the “official organs giving effect to 
the deportation of the Jews”. The minister interpreted the third point of the paragraph as 
referring to the acts of judiciary officials, who had been, for example, “making difference 
between Jew and non-Jew, persons of left-wing and right-wing”. The subject of acts included 
in point 4 can be virtually anybody. Ries gave an example of someone giving anti-Jewish or 
anti-socialist speeches on the radio. Point 5 includes denunciators among members of the Arrow 
Cross Party, irrespective of whether the denunciations led to imprisonment. The final point of 
§15 refers to those abusing their power against individuals, for example aggressing women. 
According to Ries, also §17 of the law refers to those who allowed the above mentioned acts to 
happen, who joined Volksbund or any extreme right wing organization on their own or who 
spread propaganda.  
In general, the Hungarian people’s jurisdiction treated racial persecution as an assault on the 
Hungarian people. In the case of the commander of labor service in Kisvárda, the National 
 
 
Council of People’s Courts explicitly declared that the persecution of the Jews had not been an 
injury to those suffering under the command of the defendant or to the Jewish society, but to 
the whole Hungarian people.47 
The second matter concerning the Jewish question is the participation of Jews in the legal 
retribution, the supposed “Jewish revenge”, that some scholars consider the biggest problem of 
the system of people’s jurisdiction.48 István Bibó, the sharp-sighted socio-political analyst of 
the coalition years, established that the participation of “Jews and those affected by the anti-
Jewish laws” in the process of historical justice provided an empirical base for the theory of 
Jewish revenge.49 He argued that, in order to prevent this damaging belief, only non-Jews could 
faithfully and healingly judge “in the case of the Jews and their persecutors”. Bibó’s standpoint 
is problematic because of the moral message of doing justice to the persecutors of the Jews 
without the participation of the persecuted themselves (Bibó does not seem to regard as 
problematic the participation in legal retribution of those who had been persecuted on non-
racial grounds). Yet Bibó himself perceived the problematic nature of his previous statement, 
when he remarked that the selection of people’s judges according to their non-Jewish origin 
would not be really different from the previous racial persecution: “making such difference 
between Hungarian and Hungarian is itself already fascism”.50 
Ákos Major, first chairman of the Budapest People’s Court, later president of the National 
Council of People’s Courts, asserts in his memoirs that he discussed the possible problem of 
antisemitism fostered by the Jewish presence in people’s jurisdiction with the under-secretary 
responsible for the people’s courts, and also with communist Minister of the Interior, László 
Rajk and the leader of the communists, Mátyás Rákosi himself. According to Major, they 
agreed that the problem could be solved by intervening into the process through which the 
political parties delegated the people’s judges. Rajk asked for data on the presence of Jews in 
Hungarian political justice, that Major provided (it is not clear how he obtained such data), but 
the issue eventually died away.51 
As a matter of fact, political forces had not many options to solve the problem. The alternatives 
were to do nothing, thus contributing to the persistence of the Jewish revenge theory, or to 
intervene and adjust the system of political justice according to racial distinction. Both 
alternatives would have led to the decrease of legitimacy. Finally they chose the first option. 
Hungarian jurisdiction on political crimes did not apply the distinction between Jew and non-
Jew. This was the case with the legal classification of crimes, as well as in the regulation of the 
proceeding, or in the filling of positions (people’s judges, chairmen of the council, people’s 
prosecutors, and others). Both the legal construction of the plaintiff and that of the political 
subject of historical justice lacked such a differentiation. In this way, the system did not repeat 
the homogenizing and forceful identification introduced by Nazism. It left it to those 
participating in the proceeding to decide whether they are biased or not by their personal 
experiences.52 
A systematic and complete investigation of the practice of people’s courts would necessarily 
involve also an assessment of the nature and prevalence of past deeds that led to individuals 
actually facing justice. The offered insights into the legal discourse on political crimes reveal 
that the system of political justice was rooted in the local socio-historical background in 
Hungary and had specific features in relation to the international developments. The first of the 
two new categories of crime that the new legal discourse introduced, war crime, was in part in 
 
 
accordance with international regulations (crime against peace and war crime) while the second 
one, crime against the people, emerged from a specific Hungarian historical background. The 
legal discourse on past crimes imposed the national framework, making “the Hungarians” the 
subject of historical justice. The “historical catastrophe” was thus interpreted as a national 
tragedy that happened to the Hungarian people. Although the legal discourse, because of an 
anti-fascist standpoint, did not apply any differentiation between a Jew and a non-Jew, so there 
was no distinct category of an “anti-Jewish crime”, yet crimes related to the persecution of the 
Jews could be tried as crimes against part of the Hungarian society. In a sense, the Hungarian 
categorization was even subtler than the one based on the conception of Holocaust-memory, 
the latter permitting only three positions: persecutor, (Jewish) victim, and bystander. Not only 
actual anti-Jewish deeds became punishable in post-1945 Hungary, but also the promotion of 
anti-Jewish ideas. At the same time, the legal discourse on political crimes made also other 
previous types of persecution, such as political and social persecution, punishable by law.  
 
Erring From the Right Path: Religious Conceptions of the Catastrophe 
“We have lived through one of the greatest catastrophes of our homeland” – thus begins the 
pastoral letter of the Catholic bishops on “the sins of new paganism, real democracy and 
freedom” that was read publicly in the Churches of Hungary in early July 1945.53 Besides 
material ruins, it points to the even more depressing “moral ruins manifested in the souls”. 
According to the document, the “respect of authority, the most important pillar of national life, 
broke down” together with the faith in traditions. This happened despite the fact that “we 
received many blows because the forces, intervening in the management of our fate, 
contravened the past, and broke with the ancient faith; they attempted to attain their limitless 
goals on the basis of new pagan principles”. Among the evil deeds of new paganism, the 
pastoral letter mentions that “innocent people were interned, despoiled of wealth, deported, 
murdered, as if there were no Ten Commandments, as if the command of love was not 
announced, binding us even in relation to our enemies, and without which one ceases to be 
Christian.” It reminded the listeners that those who took part in the realization of the inhuman 
decisions, or supported them, “forgot the teaching of our faith”. Referring to the “robbing of 
those who left” the document lays down that “the war doesn’t justify sin and doesn’t suspend 
the binding of the Ten Commandments”. The same goes for denunciations of neighbors. After 
these unambiguous references to the persecution of the Jews, probably alluding to the hostile 
activities of the Red Army in Hungary, the Bishops declared that those violated against their 
own will are without sins before God.  
One part of the pastoral letter deals explicitly with the POWs and Jews, referring to the latter 
as “escapees” and “deported”. The bishops expected Christian solidarity and agreement from 
the believers in order to avoid, in the name of retribution, the self-destruction of the nation. The 
document ends with statements on how the Catholic Church shall contribute to the “real 
democracy”, with honoring its martyrs, and with declaring its miraculous survival: “the news 
about the intention of the Russian troops to destroy the Church did not prove to be true”.  
The Hungarian Committee of Universal Consistory, composed of all non-Catholic Christian 
Churches, announced its Festive Declaration “in the midst of development of the greatest 
historical drama, when the country was liberated from the occupation, in the ruins of a collapsed 
 
 
world, but among the reassuring signs of a new epoch”.54 Accordingly, the declaration calls 
everybody to repentance: 
Let’s examine our acts and thoughts, let’s account for how we sinned against God and 
human, and let’s in dust and ashes sigh over our mistakes that we committed or because 
of what we failed to do either as nation or as individual. After having recognized our 
sins, let’s contradict publicly all such satanic teachings that deprave the dignity of God-
image, and take away the freedom of man. 
 
In the following, the declaration stands by the importance of international peace and the 
necessity of social transformation in Hungary, though regretting the fact that replacing the old 
order with the new entailed painful tensions. Finally, after announcing the necessity to 
reconstruct the Church and to re-establish faith in the Christian truths, it encourages to repair 
and to maintain the integrity of Christ’s body.  
It is hard, certainly, to speak of a uniform Jewish religious position toward the destruction. In 
my analysis I rely on two sources, according to the two important religious movements of Jews 
in Hungary. The authors of the Bulletin of Orthodox Community, journal of the Autonomous 
Orthodox Israelite Community, apply several denominations for the catastrophe (without using 
this term). In 1947, the first article of the first issue, Before the Autumn feasts55, for example, 
speaks of the “aftershocks of the sufferings of the terrible years”, “latter grave years”, bloodshed 
(vérzivatar), and “dreadful loss of our blood”. The author, Dezső Korein (1870–1949), a 
functionary of the orthodox Central Committee, states that  
our life is set out on Biblical grounds. It is our concern not only to declare the truths and 
the directions of our holy laws but to live according to them and to set an example both 
to our descendants and the whole humankind […] We don’t deny the past which is the 
fundament of our present and the assurance of our future. We are driven, in our frame 
of mind, by the direction and the moral rules of our holy traditions.  
 
Consequently all those who “stayed alive due to the peculiar goodwill of God Almighty”, have 
the “holy obligation” to keep the traditions, religious faith and strictly follow the holy laws. The 
article calls for praying to God: “we erred, we became faithless, forgive our sins”. This provides 
remedy in the future, that is, the supply of the next generations of Hungarian Orthodoxy. In the 
issue of April 1948 one can read that  
we think with sorrow to those brothers of ours, destroyed by the murderous terror, who 
remained behind in the gas chambers, in the labor service, and in the death camps of the 
deportations: to our half million brothers in Hungary and to the six million Jewish 
martyrs.56 
 
Although the journal did not deal explicitly with the recent catastrophe, but rather with its 
consequences, one can indirectly conclude that the “blows of fate” were the consequence of 
abandoning the right course.  
The inauguration speech of Rabbi Béla Eisenberg (1908–83) held in Győr at the monument 
dedicated to the city’s martyrs of deportation and labor service, directly addressed the question 
of the recent catastrophe.57 Eisenberg, who was the rabbi of Győr from 1947, and one year later 
was appointed the rabbi of the Vienna Jewish Community, represented the Neolog movement. 
 
 
His oration, published in the journal of the National Rabbi Association, begins with the citation 
from the Bible (Jeremiah 4:31): “Woe is me now! For my soul fainteth before the murderers”. 
He thus draw a comparison: the sorrow of the prophet over the “devastation of his homeland 
and his crying for the misfortune of his people” fades out in relation to the mourning of the 
remnants of Jewry in the present. Eisenberg expresses the inexpressible nature of the “tragedy”: 
“words can only follow as faint shadows the horrible reality of the fact”. As for the reason for 
the tragedy, the orator said:  
The sinner built the temple of the evil whose altar is: the death camp, whose sacrificial 
flame is: the permanently eddying smoke of the gas chamber and the crematoria, 
whose music is: innocent children’s scream of death, and whose sacrificial priests are: 
the raging herd of crooked henchmen. 
 
Although these temples of sin have been destroyed by the Allies, continues Eisenberg, under 
the ruins there are still bleeding human hearts. After giving some examples, he switches to the 
present and the future: 
when standing before the memory of 5,000 brothers of Győr, our purpose mustn’t 
exclusively be to bring back the bloody shades, the fearful horrors of the past; since 
the representation of reality might cause that, as before the evil period of the Flood, 
the sentence of the Bible is announced again, the most tragic sentence ever written on 
this earth: ‘And the Lord regretted that he had made man on the earth, and it grieved 
him to his heart. So the Lord said, ‘I will blot out man whom I have created from the 
face of the land’ (Genesis 6: 6, 7).  
 
That is to say, it is the memory of the martyrs that obliges us to look into the future, ‘the future 
of Israel and the whole humankind. By looking to the future,  
we may see that from this inexpressible historical villainy a significant, even the most 
significant historical factor will become, and that after this darkest period of human 
history the peaceful star of justice lightens. [...] Only this thought can give us the 
strength to get free from brooding shades of the past.  
 
Eisenberg makes difference between the war, “this gigantic catastrophe, into the filthy mire of 
blood of which the whole world sank”, and the “great tragedy of Jewry”. The latter must be the 
example for the future according to which Eretz Yisrael is the only solution to “this thousands-
year old question” (it means, the so-called Jewish question) both to the Jews and to “the 
consciousness of the entire humanity”. Recompensing the Jewish tragedy, the “biggest 
historical injustice”, Eisenberg continued, was a precondition of the future worldwide 
establishment of democracy and equality before the law. The monument, accordingly, “must 
eternally propagate what the consequence is when the evil and hatred, the violence and injustice 
takes dominance over man”.  
 
On the basis of these religious responses, it is not inappropriate to speak of a particular religious 
discourse on the catastrophe that has more common features than differences. Localizing what 
happened in the long history of “blows” on the respective religious community is what 
characterized it. Since the recent catastrophe was not seen as unprecedented in nature, the 
 
 
reasons attributed to it are also similar to the interpretations of the precedent cases (in 
Eisenberg’s speech, inexpressibility refers to the greatness of sorrow and not to the 
impossibility of representation; what bans to exclusively represent the reality of the tragedy is 
that it might provoke, by making the past evil present, the wrath of God). The abandonment of 
faith, turning away from traditions and breaking the God’s commandments – are the commonly 
revealed causes. The “blows” are understood as God’s punishment. Believers must thus return 
to the right path as only this would lead to the recovery of both individuals and the community.  
Universalism is another common feature of the post-catastrophic religious discourse. Since 
Christianity has always proclaimed its values as universal, crimes committed against these 
values have also been conceptualized as universal, as inhuman. Christian authorities claim that 
breaking the law of God, according to which all human beings are equal, concerns the entire 
humankind and thus it is not specifically a Jewish matter. This sort of religious universalism 
greatly differs from the universalism of the Jewish religious stance, according to which what 
happened specifically to the Jews concerns the whole of humanity. 
It is important to note that in all cases the catastrophe is clearly differentiated from the war 
(though the destruction by the war constitutes one of its important elements): it was theft, 
murder and fornication as breaking certain of the Ten Commandments; racial differentiation 
and idolatry as ‘satanic teachings’; and Jewish tragedy as opposed to catastrophe (identified 
with the war). We can even identify a sort of Christian discourse of anti-fascism: the Catholic 
authority confronts the inacceptable refusal of the fundamental Christian principle that all 
humans are equal before God; the Protestant one called fascist ideology a destructive “satanic 
teaching” that imposed the classification of the blood principle. Although none of the Christian 
sources apply Jewish identification in conceptualising the catastrophe, they unmistakably refer 
to the sins committed in relation to the persecution of Jews. 
By this we already started the discussion on the differences. The Christian institutions spoke of 
the Hungarian catastrophe (this is why the pastoral letter deals also with the question of secular-
governmental authority). The catastrophe was conceptualized as a moral crisis of the nation, an 
anomic social state in the Durkheimian sense, which is caused by turning away from Christian 
values. The Catholic Church explained the moral crisis, named as a new paganism and 
understood as human behavior without the guidance of tradition and authority, by the turning 
away of Hungarians from the Ten Commandments and the laws of God in general. The 
Protestant Consistory found the causes of the catastrophe, also conceived as amorality, in the 
work of “satanic evil”. The Jewish sources, by contrast, spoke of the martyrdom of the 
Hungarian Jews on one hand, and of all the Jews, regardless of nationality, on the other. 
Eisenberg came to the conclusion that the lessons of the tragedy were that there was no 
difference between the Jews of the different countries, and that they deserve their own country 
as belonging to one distinct nation. Jewish religious discourses apply a double conception of 
the catastrophe when singling out the Jewish tragedy as a distinct part of the national 
catastrophe. 
The post-catastrophic restoration was conceived according to how the religious community was 
constructed. For Christian sources, postwar material, mental and spiritual restoration was 
primarily a national task, while the Jewish ones were occupied by the fate of the local 
community, and by the universal questions posed by the Jewish tragedy. The Hungarian 
national frame was important when it comes to the state of the Jewish religious institutions of 
 
 
the country. Their positions in relation to the idea that human action caused the catastrophe 
were also quite different, though religious authorities avoided any black-and-white description. 
Although to a different degree, both Christian documents deal with the question of the 
responsibility of the Church in the development of the catastrophe. As a conclusion, they argue 
for the necessary (institutional) reform of the Church. Protestant churches even call for a mass 
repentance, by which individuals can examine their previous acts and thoughts in order to 
recognize sin that must be rejected. The Jewish sources, conversely, avoid self-positioning 
exclusively as victim; they raise the question of their own role in the tragedy. Yet it is not 
surprising that especially the Christian sources deal more thoroughly with the questions of guilt 
and consciousness of perpetrators.  
 
Moral Degradation, Mental Illness and Lack of Solidarity: Responses of Public 
Intellectuals 
“The catastrophe has not yet even passed, we still live in it” observes Gyula Szekfű (1883–
1955), in his article entitled “Bitter lesson” in the first issue of the civic journal Világ, on May 
14, 1945.58 Being an influential historian and publicist during the interwar years, and academic 
professor, who opposed the Nazi orientation primarily from a Conservative-Catholic stance, 
Szekfű starts his argument by pointing to a ranger who got lost in the wilderness. After having 
found his way out, “he will carry in his memories for a long time the enormities that he got to 
know there”, meaning that his experience with the wilderness will determine his future life. 
This exemplifies that “things cannot pass without consequence and individuals cannot avoid 
drawing the lessons.” Szekfű continues by saying that ‘neither the great human community, the 
nation’ can avoid drawing the lessons of its previous deeds since ‘its every deed conditions its 
future path with cold consequentiality’. For Szekfű, the ultimate question is whether people can 
acknowledge that what makes it difficult in life is the logical outcome of their previous actions 
for which they carry responsibility. What actions was he talking about? “The stone has been 
thrown and we already know who was hit and how, but we tend to forget that the stone was in 
our own hands”. Szekfű argues that nobody can reproach the others with issues of the yesterday 
since nobody is without sins, and no one can judge the nation: “the collective crimes are all 
ours, not only those who committed them”, “all of us are responsible in a way, since we are all 
members of this lost nation, and none of us had enough strength to show the way out in time, 
to lead out the people from the jungle that the country was made to be”.  
Although using a rather metaphoric language, Szekfű refers to certain specific historical events 
as national sins that ought to be confessed.59 One is the Arrow Cross takeover of October 15, 
1944 when the army could not enforce the Regent Horthy’s command on armistice. Szekfű also 
makes reference to the deportation of the Jews by flaying the “easy apology about the outcast 
of hundreds of thousands from the body of the nation, and their merciless destruction”.  
Not only arguing for the necessity to face and acknowledge the moral degradation of the past, 
Szekfű also calls for the identification of the causes behind the catastrophe in order to prevent 
history from returning: “Soul-searching must be done to discover the sins and to take a dislike 
on them to avoid repeatedly committing them ever again.” What this means is that every “cell 
of the nation”, regardless of the scale of responsibility, must look inside and carefully define 
his or her previous sinful deeds as causes of the later consequences. According to Szekfű, this 
practice would result in detaching the self from those views by which the errors were made, 
 
 
since the individual can recognize the mistakes and realize their terrible consequences. Drawing 
the bitter lesson serves as the rightful definition not only of the moral behavior but also of a 
moral and right political orientation toward the future.  
Zoltán Horváth (1900–1968), journalist and historian, and leading figure of the Social 
Democratic Party, survived the war in hiding and under false identity, being persecuted both as 
a leftist and a Jew. In his article, “Reckoning with the past”,60 Horváth argues that the recent 
war was different from all previous ones in the sense that it broke out due to an unprecedented 
ideology. The Hungarian state (only partly representing the people) “served a trend [that is, the 
Axis Powers led by the Nazis] that a nation with healthy instincts should have denied even if, 
by accident, it wouldn’t have been defeated but temporarily succeeded in achieving victory”. 
What is more, Horváth continues, the regime in interwar Hungary was a “vile and greedy class 
domination” that should be condemned for its moral smallness on its own, independently from 
the later involvement in the war.  
In order to acquire “the inner security, the mental balance and the human or national conscience 
without which it is not possible to build and maintain a new and free country”, it is central for 
Horváth to completely reject the former regime. In his view, similarly to that of Szekfű’s, the 
past heavily affected the present and the future, albeit in a different manner: “The past 
inhumanities, the cowardice, the legacy of the perfidies committed against our own people have 
left so deep and incurable mental wounds with which it is impossible to produce a healthy 
national life.” Horváth argues against collective compunction because it prevents necessary 
(national) self-respect. Probably because of what he endured in the past, Horváth refused to be 
included in the community of perpetrators and thus disagreed with any collective “mea culpa 
attitude”.  
As a way to an “inner clarification”, Horváth also proposed massive individual introspection: 
“Here we have to appeal to the methods of psychoanalysis and consider as our principal goal to 
make conscious those breaks in us caused by the sufferings, human mortifications, humiliations 
and repressions of the past.” By this, Horváth acknowledged the effect of the past on the present, 
even on those “who were not part of the past”, the oppressed people. He called for the exposition 
of those breaks in order to “acquire a powerful and decisive weapon into our hands against the 
danger that similar dark forces could once again commit similar crimes against us in our name.” 
Besides mental healing and avoiding the repetition of history, a further purpose of this practice 
is to convince the world that in Hungary “a dwarfish minority despotized over great masses of 
the nation, whose one and only guilt – although one shouldn’t marginalize it – is that it tolerated 
the regime for too long, it allowed the terror to gain power over themselves almost until the 
psychosis of suicide.”  
Ernő Munkácsi’s (1896–1950) editorial, entitled “For a new life”, appeared on November 18, 
1945 on the cover page of the first issue of the newly launched weekly journal Új Élet – A 
Magyar Zsidóság Lapja (New Life – Paper of the Hungarian Jewry). The author was previously 
a secretary and later a prosecutor of the Israelite Community of Pest. Following the German 
occupation of Hungary on March 19, 1944, Munkácsi was appointed General Secretary of the 
Jewish Council in Budapest. Munkácsi starts his article as follows: “We propagate ‘New life’ 
over the grave of the majority of Hungarian Jewry – over the smoky ruins of its destructed life.” 
By drawing the lesson from previous “tragedies” in the “many thousands years long history of 
Jewry”, he directs the attention of readers to the ‘signs of the will of life’ triumphantly finding 
 
 
their way from the ruins. Paraphrasing the slogan of the French Revolution, however, the author 
attributes an essential role to the memory of the past: “We forgot nothing and learnt a lot”. First 
of all, one must never forget that “the Jewry was the social layer that many times, almost 
uniquely, suffered the most during the past sable period” of the past 26 years in Hungary. 
Munkácsi states that those “who were eager to rob our moral and material goods, are our 
enemies and the enemies of the Hungarian people”. Second, he reminds the readers that after 
the introduction of the anti-Jewish laws, “we explored our truth and the peril threatening the 
nation with the confidence of the 1,000 year-long coexistence, and with the conscious faith in 
eternal historical lessons.” Finally, the memory of those “many thousand Hungarian Jews”, 
“our martyrs” must never be forgotten. 
Among the lessons that “we learnt” Munkácsi mentioned that “our decay” was caused not only 
by “external enemies […] but also [by] our inner diseases: factionism, self-interest, the short-
sightedness of worrying exclusively for oneself”. Hungarian Jewry did not learn from the 
lessons of the past, and did not hear the warnings that “the people must perish who don’t 
understand the two leading ideas of the time: the necessity of equalising wealth and the 
importance of organisation. Together with mass conversion to Christianity during the 
persecutions, this prevented the Hungarian Jews from joining forces and reacting in solidarity. 
It should be noted that Munkácsi, as his article series entitled “How did it happen?” in the same 
journal testifies to, was deeply convinced that the Jewish council made a huge mistake when 
being in contact only with the German authorities and turning to the Hungarians only when it 
was too late.61 
“Yet our sufferings did not end with this” – continues Munkácsi, pointing to the challenges 
stemming from the social environment in the immediate postwar period: “The hyenas of 
reaction, who envyingly regret this small layer [of society], are watching for the remains of 
Israel that escaped the dangers.” The normative relation to the past, underlying the text of 
Munkácsi, is identified by Jewishness itself: “The meaning of Jewishness: keeping everything 
valuable and eternal from the past yet finding all new that reanimates the old, that brings it close 
to the heart, to the mind, to life”.  
The most important lesson of the past was the need for a thorough democratization of Hungarian 
Jewish life: Munkácsi argues that by introducing universal and secret suffrage, the Community 
must be reorganized to be the center of Hungarian Jews, where the will of the community and 
not that of a clique of interest is definitive. Furthermore, Hungarian Jewry should get relief and 
compensation from the majority society; Munkácsi necessitates not only the legal reparation 
for the previous anti-Jewish legislation but, “through the laws and decrees to be adopted, the 
creation of an atmosphere and the undertaking of guarantees so that the tragedy of the past 
might never occur again, so that Hungarian Jews indeed possess equal rights in this country.” 
Munkácsi finished his line of thought by declaring that “it is not death but life that Judaism is 
the religion of, so we truly serve the memory of our martyrs if we start a new life.” 
 
Reading these three opinion articles in parallel, it is hard to decide what is more striking: the 
similarities or the differences. To begin with the former, all authors share the conviction that 
the catastrophe must be explained by the past. All of them put emphasis on historical 
continuities rather than on the idea of rupture. The relation between past and present was 
univocally conceived as a chain of cause-consequence. This idea of history lies behind the 
 
 
intellectual claim to interpret the catastrophe: one should be occupied by the past in order to 
define the causes that determine the present. This constitutes the condition of postwar (social, 
material, and mental) reconstruction. Analyzing the causes of the catastrophe is also the source 
of moral orientation: it is the only way to determine what to do in the present and future. What 
is more, “drawing the lessons” from the past, as the prevailing form of dealing with the past, 
serves to avoid the repetition of the past catastrophe, never identified with the war. 
Another common characteristic of the analyzed intellectual interpretations is their national 
framework. The catastrophe, which happened to the Hungarian nation, is narrated as an intra-
national oppression. Szekfű speaks of the persecution of Jews as the “outcast of hundreds of 
thousands from the body of the nation”, and of the persecutors as “the stone [that] was in our 
own hands”. In his view, the nation is a quasi-organism bound together by a collective sin. 
Horváth speaks similarly, though from the position of a former victim, when describing the 
national rift in terms of the opposition of the ruling class against the dominated people. By 
formulating that “crimes [were committed] against us in our name”, he refers to the topos, the 
“ruling [of] the people against the people”. Munkácsi spoke in a similar way also about the 
Hungarian Jews, differentiated as one layer of society. For Munkácsi, the fact that a clique 
driven by self-interest ruled the Jews of Hungary was the inner cause of the tragedy. The Jewish 
suffering, though particular, remained one of numerous cases of suffering of the nation. Szekfű 
took the discursive position of the “Hungarian persecutor”, Horváth spoke as “persecuted 
Hungarian” without applying the Jewish identification, and Munkácsi’s position was that of the 
“persecuted Hungarian Jew”’. 
This brings us to the question of differences. Most importantly, this discursive subfield is 
characterized by the multiplicity of narratives on what happened and why. Szekfű applied a 
civilizational narrative when identifying the decay as moral degradation, and a sort of barbarism 
of the wilderness. He used the metaphor of a jungle to signify the lack of solidarity between 
parts of the nation. Szekfű also relied on Christian morality when putting emphasis on 
(collective) sins. In his conception, the realm of dealing with the past was part of personal 
consciousness. Its practice included soul-searching, understood as the analytical dissociation of 
cause and consequence of one’s deeds to avoid repetition of history and as a way of ideological 
purification. 
Structurally, Horváth’s discourse was very similar except for the fact that he applied a medical-
therapeutic narrative inspired mostly by psychoanalysis. In this case the hardships of the past 
caused intellectual and mental wound to the people; accordingly, the catastrophe is seen as a 
mental illness: the rule of instincts (inhumanities and dark forces). Instead of searching for the 
soul, historically rooted in Christianity, Horváth proposed to apply the methods of 
psychoanalysis as a way of dealing with the past. Accordingly, healing from the mental illness 
means putting an end to the repetition of the past (as repetition compulsion). At the same time, 
Horváth also spoke a different language since he applied a Marxist vocabulary. In this latter 
narrative the catastrophe (primarily the war) was an outcome of the anti-democratic system of 
class domination, which could be healed only by societal transformation.  
Munkácsi was interested in the inner causes of what he called the tragedy: the disorganization 
of the Jewish Community that resulted in the lack of solidarity when most needed. He applied 
a moral-political narrative when putting emphasis on the non-democratic rule; he also relied on 
a quasi-medical narrative when identifying the tragedy as an inner (moral) illness. The 
 
 
“tragedy” was the destruction of one layer of Hungarian society that in itself was the subject of 
the catastrophe: it testified to the radical amorality and fracture of the political community of 
Hungarians. In Munkácsi’s account, the catastrophe was not limited to the war; the antisemitic 
regulations of the Horthy-regime constituted a gradually growing menace in his narrative. In 
allusions one can identify here a “functional explanation” for the persecution of the Jews 
(“robbing our moral and material goods”). Accordingly, the inner proposal for recovery was 
the democratization and social equality in the Jewish community, while the outer, addressing 
the whole Hungarian society, was the restitution and compensation, together with political 
equality with non-Jewish Hungarians; the recovery of the Hungarian Jewry was conceived as a 
Hungarian national interest.  
 
Conclusion 
My article opened with a hypothesis that a discursive regime existed in the immediate aftermath 
of the war, which dealt with the historical period of the Second World War. Concerning 
historical temporality, conceptual repertoire, subject positions and normative prescriptions, it 
had its specific features, radically different from those prevailing today. Irrespective of 
institutional discourses, the recent past was conceptualized as a catastrophe. The concept of a 
catastrophe, together with that of a tragedy, referred to a break in history, and was inscribed in 
historical development. There is a continuity of historical breaks. This is particularly clear when 
comparing the conception of catastrophe with that of a historical/collective trauma. Unlike the 
latter, the former not only calls for the identification of the causes but also for a definition of 
human action and responsibility. This is due to the way history was conceived by those who 
lived through it. Postwar conceptions of the catastrophe are thus characterized by the urge to 
disclose the causes in order to direct a social action toward the future. Not only were 
contemporaries aware of the specific nature of the disaster related – but not restricted – to the 
war, but they shared the belief that understanding its causes would prevent its reoccurrence in 
the future. In contrast to the present-day “age of commemoration”, to use Pierre Nora’s term, 
the postwar era was the age of learning from history, in which drawing the lessons of the past 
was a way to avoid the reoccurrence of the catastrophe. In the postwar discursive regime, 
consequently, questions of explicability or representability were not raised. Contrary to the 
conception of Holocaust-memory, explanation was a moral obligation, and the limits of 
representation, if questioned at all, had to do with the relation between the sacred and the 
profane.  
The catastrophe occurred in the chain of events and happened to the Hungarians (or Hungarian 
Jews). This national interpretation is more or less true for each institutional discourse analyzed 
in this article. However, religious discourses construct the catastrophe as universal, which has 
national significance only because it happened (also) to the Hungarians. Turning away from the 
Ten Commandments or God as such, which was the basic reason for the catastrophe, lacks 
historic or geographic specificity.  
What is striking is how diverse were the conceptions of the recent past compared to the regime 
of Holocaust-memory. The jurisdiction on people’s courts dealt with politics as a realm of 
power, and defined political community according to one’s role in the development of the 
catastrophe. Legal discourse criminalized politics in large sense of the word. Religious 
discourses dealt with morality as the foundation of the community. What caused the catastrophe 
 
 
was turning away from the commands of God and from the teachings of the past. Religious 
conceptions of the catastrophe, however, mutually exclude each other since only particular 
religious prescriptions and traditions could lead to recovery. Comparing to these two rather 
unified discourses, public intellectuals’ interpretations rely on a multiplicity of narratives, each 
conceptualizing the catastrophe according to binary oppositions, such as civilization-barbarism, 
healthy-ill, (good)-evil, (heaven)-hell, democratic-antidemocratic, progressive-reactionary, and 
so on.  
The method of cross-comparison allows us not only to identify features of discourses chosen 
according to a mapping principle, but also to take into account their interactions. While there 
was not much of an interaction between the legal (state) discourse and the religious ones, 
intellectuals drew heavily on both. They used the new legal vocabulary and shared the legal 
construction of the catastrophe when they assumed that the former regime had been against the 
people, the catastrophe had been the meaningless sacrifice of the people, and Jews had been 
persecuted as one part of society. Legal criminal terms, such as the new political crimes, often 
used, symbolized the sins of the entire nation; in the usage of the concept of sin, religious and 
political-legal discourses combined. The fact that this sort of discursive interaction always 
entails the change of meaning is clearly visible in how the practice of soul-searching transforms 
in public intellectuals’ use. While in the religious context this practice aims at naming and 
denying sin, in the public one it serves reasoning by the analytical differentiation between (good 
and bad) deeds as causes in historical developments. 
The analysis of institutional discourses proved that subject positions are not necessarily 
constructed according to the classification of the Nazi persecution. The homogenizing racial 
identification of “the Jews” did not play any role in the catastrophe-conceptions (the recognition 
that in Nazi ideology all Jews were equal came up in the Jewish religious interpretation as a 
lesson of the past). There was no unified Jewish position. Subject positions taken by individuals, 
labeled by the Nazis as Jews, radically differed according to particular institutional discourses: 
religious Jewish utterances had more in common with Christian utterances than with Jewish 
secular ones. They also differed according to the discursive distinction between the “Jew” and 
those “qualified as Jew”, that is, if someone assumed the Jewish position or not. It was the 
discursive position that determined the utterance and not Jewish origin as such.  
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